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Article
Attitudes have long been considered to be an “indispensable 
concept” (Allport, 1935, p. 798) within social psychology, 
and with good reason. It is understood that “ . . . all aspects 
of responding, including emotions, cognitions, and overt 
behavior, are infused with the evaluative meaning that atti-
tudes impart” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998, p. 269). Thus, not 
only do attitudes color our evaluations of the social environ-
ment but they provide us with approach and avoidance moti-
vations to guide our interactions within it (e.g., Cacioppo & 
Berntson, 1994). Indeed, by virtue of the fact that attitudes 
label things (i.e., people, issues, and objects) as positive or 
negative they necessarily have implications for action (Eiser 
& Fazio, 2008).
However, despite the centrality of the attitude concept to 
social psychology (e.g., Ajzen, 2001; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Fazio & Petty, 2008) and despite the recognition that 
the majority of our likes and dislikes are learned and not 
innate (e.g., Rozin & Millman, 1987), the study of how atti-
tudes are initially acquired and shaped by experience has 
been relatively neglected (Eiser, Shook, & Fazio, 2007).
Furthermore, where research into attitude formation pro-
cesses has been conducted, this has tended to focus princi-
pally on how attitudes are formed through “passive” 
experience—where opportunities to learn occur indepen-
dently of an individual’s own behavior (e.g., mere exposure, 
see Bornstein, 1989; evaluative conditioning, see De Houwer, 
Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001)—with research into attitude for-
mation in “active” or “experiential” learning contexts receiv-
ing less attention (Eiser & Fazio, 2008).
Attitude Formation via Personal 
Exploration
Actively establishing what (or where) is good/beneficial or 
bad/costly within a given context (i.e., what should be 
approached or avoided) necessarily constitutes attitude for-
mation, as we tend to acquire attitudes consistent with our 
experiences (Eiser & Fazio, 2008). However, active learning 
scenarios present people with a challenge. The world is a 
risky place where approach–avoidance decisions are often 
made on the basis of incomplete or imperfect information, 
which can lead to errors. For instance, wrongly classifying 
something as “bad” when it is “good” can mean that some-
thing desirable (e.g., appetizing food) is avoided. 
Misclassifying things as “good” when they are “bad” could 
mean that undesirable (or even hazardous) things are 
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approached (e.g., unappetizing or poisonous food). 
Importantly, within active learning scenarios, feedback about 
things is often tied to approach responses; thus, it is only by 
taking a risk and actively sampling or exploring the environ-
ment that we have the opportunity to learn and refine our 
appraisal of it. Remaining quiescent, while often less risky, 
presents no such learning opportunity.
Thus, when entering a new learning context we must 
strike a balance between approach–avoidance motivations to 
facilitate goal pursuit (e.g., finding appetizing food) while 
minimizing the risk of harm (e.g., eating something disagree-
able). Exactly how we strike and refine this balance depends 
upon a number of factors, including personality factors (e.g., 
sensation seeking, see Zuckerman, 1994; regulatory focus, 
see Higgins, 1998) and incentive values (e.g., Liberman, 
1993). Ultimately, though, it is often our expectancy about 
the likely outcome of an approach/avoidance response (based 
on previous direct of inferred experience) and how consistent 
this is with their current goals, which shapes such decisions 
(consistent with expectancy-value theory, for example, 
Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004; see also Feather, 1988, 1992).
The BeanFest Studies
The gap in our understanding of attitude learning in active 
learning settings prompted Fazio, Eiser, and colleagues (i.e., 
Eiser, Fazio, Stafford, & Prescott, 2003; Fazio et al., 2004) to 
develop the BeanFest paradigm. Based on the principles of 
reinforcement learning (see Sutton & Barto, 1998), BeanFest 
is a two-stage computer-based foraging paradigm that inves-
tigates how attitudes form and generalize toward new stimuli 
(in this case beans) where feedback about the nature of stim-
uli (i.e., whether or not they are “good” or “bad”) is contin-
gent on the sampling decisions of the learner. For details of 
the procedure, see Fazio et al. (2004) or try BeanFest go to: 
h t tp : / /www.mi l l i second .com/download/samples /
v3/BeanFest/.
One of the key findings from studies using BeanFest is 
how biases in approach behavior tend to result in persistent 
negative asymmetries in the learning and generalization (see 
Eiser & Fazio, 2008; Fazio et al., 2004; Shook, Fazio, & 
Eiser, 2007). In short, because participants are motivated to 
approach positive beans and avoid negative beans there is a 
greater likelihood that they will approach and correct false-
positives (i.e., believing a bad bean is good) than false nega-
tives (i.e., believing a good bean is bad). This means that 
correct identification of “bad” beans typically exceeds that of 
“good” beans (negative learning asymmetry). Moreover, 
consistent with the “negativity bias” (see Cacioppo, Gardner, 
& Berntson, 1997; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), participants 
typically show a bias toward labeling previously unseen 
beans as “bad,” even after controlling for the differences in 
the learning of the “good” and “bad” beans (negative gener-
alization asymmetry).
Research using BeanFest has yielded pioneering insight 
into attitude formation in active learning scenarios and the 
implications this holds for the understanding of diverse top-
ics, such as prejudice (Deutsch & Fazio, 2008), political ide-
ology (Shook & Fazio, 2009), depression (Conklin, Strunk, 
& Fazio, 2009), emotional reactivity to stressful events 
(Pietri, Fazio, & Shook, 2013), and vulnerability to emo-
tional disorders (Shook, Fazio, & Vasey, 2007). However, to 
date all experiments utilizing BeanFest have focused on atti-
tude learning in perceptively uncertain but objectively stable, 
prescriptive environments; where stimulus valence is 
unchanging (i.e., where good beans are always good and bad 
beans always bad) and where target stimuli are presented 
sequentially (i.e., where each trial constitutes the presenta-
tion of a single bean to participants devoid of other contex-
tual cues that might aid the decision to approach or avoid it).
These parameters pose problems for our broader under-
standing of attitude formation processes in risky experien-
tial-learning scenarios. For example, our social and physical 
environments are arguably more variable than presented 
within BeanFest, with the availability and/or valence of 
desired resources being altered by our or others’ interactions 
within them (or by the simple passing of time). For example, 
Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the commons” illustrates how 
social competition for a limited resource in line with one’s 
self interests can lead to the overexploitation and rapid 
decline in the availability and/or quality of that resource. 
Also, it is not always the case we make sequential, isolated 
sampling decisions based solely on the features of an indi-
vidual stimulus, but rather we often concurrently utilize 
other features or items within the decision-making context to 
aid or landmark these sampling decisions (e.g., when choos-
ing groceries, for example, Putrevu & Lord, 2001).
Considerable research both in human and in lower-animal 
subjects exists to indicate how both these (and other) factors 
can influence real-world foraging and navigation (e.g., 
Bateson & Kacelnik, 1998; Golledge, 1999; Hunt & Waller, 
1999; Kamil & Cheng, 2001; Sorrows & Hirtle, 1999; Weber, 
Shafir, & Blais, 2004). For instance, cognate research by 
Goldstone and colleagues (e.g., Goldstone & Ashpole, 2004; 
Goldstone, Ashpole, & Roberts, 2005; Goldstone, Roberts, 
& Gureckis, 2008; Roberts & Goldstone, 2006) indicates 
how human foraging within two-dimensional virtual envi-
ronments can be negatively affected by the presence of com-
petitors, resulting in sub-optimal sampling behavior (i.e., 
over- and under-matching of available resources) as partici-
pants utilize the foraging decisions of others to help guide 
their own decisions. With this in mind, one might hypothe-
size that factors such as the opportunity to landmark one’s 
sampling decisions could affect the attitude learning and 
generalization observed within the paradigm.
In sum, while BeanFest studies have proved invaluable in 
strengthening our understanding of how attitudes form and 
function in active learning scenarios, the question of whether 
or not the central findings from this research (e.g., the learn-
ing and generalization asymmetries) are generalizable to (a) 
perceptively more variable contexts, (b) contexts where the 
opportunity to concurrently reference (i.e., landmark) one’s 
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approach–avoidance decisions against experiences with 
other stimuli, and (c) other kinds of target stimuli (i.e., going 
beyond beans) remains open.
The principal aim of the current research was to develop 
and test a modified version of the BeanFest paradigm capa-
ble of simultaneously investigating these things—this was 
achieved through the evolution of the Treasure Island (TI) 
paradigm.
The “TI” Paradigm
The TI paradigm (outlined fully below) is purposefully 
designed to operate in a largely comparable way to BeanFest; 
however, rather than eating or rejecting beans, participants 
play the role of an explorer visiting an “island” where they 
are required to search for treasure (equivalent to eating 
“good” beans) while avoiding pirates (equivalent to avoiding 
“bad” beans). The “island” is created by simply overlaying a 
depiction of a TI across the 10 × 10 matrix used to determine 
the valence of stimuli within BeanFest. This creates a 
two-dimensional life-space with three (hidden) positive 
regions and three (hidden) negative regions (akin to the 
“good” and “bad” families of beans; see Figure 1). 
Participants are presented with a full depiction of the TI on 
all trials and so have concurrent access to all stimuli when 
making their sampling decisions.
Thus, in contrast to BeanFest, (a) stimuli are differenti-
ated by their location in the spatial matrix as opposed to their 
individual features (i.e., shape and speckling of beans), (b) 
individual sampling decisions can be landmarked against 
prior experiences at other locations, and (c) because partici-
pants can be made to believe that the pirates (negative enti-
ties) are either static or mobile, there is an opportunity to 
manipulate the perceived environmental consistency and 
hence the anticipated risk associated with sampling 
decisions.1
The remainder of this article details the development of 
the TI paradigm and reports on two studies: the first designed 
to assess whether or not the paradigm would produce the pat-
terns in sampling and learning common to BeanFest, thus 
Figure 1. Treasure Island: Highlighted within the island are the six experimental regions (3x positive and 3x negative), which are 
formally equivalent to the “coordinates” used to generate good and bad beans in BeanFest.( see Fazio et al. 2004).
Note. The experimental regions are not visible to participants.
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providing a test of whether the findings of BeanFest can be 
generalized to a new stimulus type (in this case, spatial coor-
dinates) and the second designed to investigate how a manip-
ulation of environmental consistency (specifically the 
perceived consistency of coordinate valences) would affect 
participants’ sampling decisions and attitude learning within 
the paradigm. The article ends with a consideration of the 
research implications and suggestions for further studies.
Study 1: TI and BeanFest Comparison
Study 1 was designed to test whether or not the TI paradigm 
would generate similar trends in sampling and learning to 
those observed in BeanFest. It was hypothesized that the 
similarities between the BeanFest and TI paradigms should 
mean that the negative sampling and learning asymmetries 
typical of BeanFest should emerge. That is, participants 
should show a greater tendency to approach and correct 
“false-positive” than “false negative” beliefs within the task, 
resulting in more accurate learning and recall of the negative 
coordinates versus the positive coordinates (i.e., negative 
learning asymmetry).
Method
Participants. A total of 30 (7 male and 23 female) undergrad-
uate and graduate psychology students at the University of 
Sheffield, United Kingdom, participated in this study. All 
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, were 
aged between 18 and 38 years (M
age
 = 21.7 years), and 
received partial course credit or  £2 for taking part. Twenty-
nine participants completed the sampling phase (none with 
restarts—explained below).
Procedure. TI was designed on a PC using E-Prime (Schnei-
der, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002a, 2002b). All participants 
were tested individually in a quiet laboratory cubicle. Upon 
arrival, each participant was provided with a series of instruc-
tions about TI. Participants were informed that the task 
would comprise two phases: the first taking the form of a 
“treasure hunt” in which their aim was to accrue wealth by 
sampling the environment (sampling phase); and a second 
phase, instructions about which they would receive follow-
ing the treasure hunt (recall phase). Thus, participants were 
not informed at this stage that the second phase would con-
stitute a recall task.
Sampling phase: Instructions. Participants were presented 
with the treasure map (see Figure 1) and told that the com-
puter would sequentially select coordinates for them to sam-
ple. They were informed that approach responses (made by 
pressing “Z” on the keyboard) could meet with one of two 
possible outcomes, that is, the discovery of Treasure (+10 
coins) or a Pirate Town (−10 coins). They were also told that 
avoidance responses (made by pressing “M”) would have 
no net impact on their accrued wealth, but that they would 
not receive feedback as to the valence of the coordinate (i.e., 
feedback was contingent on approach).2
Participants were notified that they would start the task 
with 50 virtual coins and that their coins tally would be 
updated following each sampling response. There was no 
upper limit to the wealth that could be accrued (other than 
that predetermined by the number of trials); however, partici-
pants were notified that if they ran out of coins, they would 
be evicted from the island and receive instructions relating to 
the second phase of the task. Unlike BeanFest, once partici-
pants were evicted from the island they were not restarted, 
unless their eviction occurred within the first 10 min of 
beginning the task (i.e., upon receiving the instructions). 
This 10-min window was introduced to prevent the prema-
ture attrition of participants. Participants evicted during this 
time were restarted minus the initial instructions, whereas 
participants evicted after this time were thanked for their 
time and dismissed.3
In addition to guaranteed course credit or £2 (approx. US 
$3) for participating, participants’ performance within the 
game was also tied to a donation to a local children’s charity. 
Participants were informed that a donation of 50p would be 
made as a result of their participation and that their final 
coins tally would be matched with an additional donation 
(i.e., 1p for every coin). The charity donation concept was 
introduced as pilot studies revealed that guaranteed course 
credit was not sufficient to motivate participants within the 
task.
Participants then received an automated demonstration of 
a sampling-phase trial, before partaking in a short practice 
session, comprising six predetermined trials. These six trials 
presented one preselected coordinate from each of the six 
regions on the island. Participants were encouraged to 
approach all six of these coordinates to become familiar with 
the outcomes of correct and incorrect approach decisions.
Sampling phase: Test trials. The sampling phase had a 3 
(Trial Block: 1, 2, 3) × 2 (Coordinate Valence: Negative vs. 
Positive) repeated-measures design. In each block, the 36 
target coordinates (18 × positive and 18 × negative, high-
lighted in Figure 1) were presented once to participants. The 
presentation order of the coordinates within each block was 
randomized except for the first 12 coordinates in Block 1. 
These trials were fixed across participants (as in BeanFest, 
see Fazio et al., 2004) to reduce the chance of premature evic-
tion from the island. These trials comprised the presentation 
of two coordinates from each of the six coordinate clusters.
Following completion of Block 3 (or when the participant 
ran out of coins), a screen appeared notifying the participant 
of their eviction from the island. Participants were instructed 
to inform the experimenter that they had completed Phase 1. 
The experimenter made a record of their coin tally before 
providing the participant with details of the second phase of 
the experiment.
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Recall phase: Instructions. Participants were informed that 
the treasure hunt aspect of the game was over and that their 
task was now to recall which coordinates were “good” and 
“bad.” They were told that they would be presented with a 
series of coordinates and that for each one they should indi-
cate whether they thought it would yield treasure (by press-
ing “Z”) or a pirate town (by pressing “M”). The computer 
then recorded whether the participants’ response accurately 
matched the actual valence of the coordinate.4
Recall phase: Test trials. On each trial, one coordinate on 
the treasure map was highlighted. Written instructions then 
appeared, prompting participants to make their judgment. 
During the recall phase, the reward and feedback structure of 
the sampling phase did not apply and participants received 
no feedback as to the “actual” valence of each coordinate. 
Participants were required to categorize each of the 36 pre-
sented coordinates, as well as estimate the valence of 34 
novel coordinates (comprising 26 coordinates adjacent to 
presented locations and 8 unaffiliated coordinates [A10, 
D4, E5, E6, F5, F6, G7, J1]). Specifically, participants were 
instructed to remember the valence of presented coordinates 
and make predictions about the likely valence of the novel 
coordinates. It was hoped that responses made within this 
phase of the game could be used to establish the extent of 
attitude learning within the paradigm and how readily atti-
tudes might generalize.
This recall assessment provides a subjective measure of 
participants’ evaluation of stimuli (i.e., coordinates) grounded 
conceptually within the expectancy-value framework of atti-
tudes (e.g., Fishbein, 1963). As the gaming aspects of the 
paradigm have ceased (i.e., participants choices no longer 
reflect approach and avoidance decisions) and participants 
are simply invited to comment on whether coordinates are 
“good” (contain treasure) or “bad” (contain pirates), this 
exercise can be seen as a direct measure of participants’ atti-
tudes rather than a behavioral index thereof. For a full justi-
fication of this measure of attitude, see Fazio et al. (2004).
Debrief. Participants were first provided with a short 
feedback questionnaire asking them to comment on the per-
ceived purpose of the study and whether they had noticed 
anything particular about the distribution of treasure and 
pirate towns. Participants were then fully debriefed, thanked, 
and dismissed.
Results
Sampling phase. A 3 (Block: 1, 2, 3) × 2 (Valence: Negative 
vs. Positive) repeated-measures ANOVA yielded main 
effects of both Valence, F(1, 28) = 30.66, p < .001, = .52 
(large effect size [ES]),5 and Block, F(2, 27) = 11.37, p < 
.001, = .46 (large ES), and a significant Block × Valence 
interaction, F(2, 27) = 6.45, p < .01, = .32 (large ES). These 
results confirmed that sampling behavior was roughly com-
parable with that observed in BeanFest, with a sharp attenu-
ation in the approach of negative stimuli but a relative 
maintenance of the approach of positive stimuli over time 
(see Figure 2 for visual comparison with Fazio et al., 2004, 
experiment 1).
Recall phase. Participants showed above chance recall for 
both positive and negative coordinates (ts ≥ 3.08, ps < .01, ds 
≥ 1.16; large ESs). This confirmed that participants had suc-
cessfully established the location of the majority of treasure 
and pirate towns on the island. A significant negative learn-
ing asymmetry was observed, t(28) = 2.06, p < .05, d = 0.39 
(small-medium ES), indicating that participants had more 
accurate knowledge of the negative coordinates on the island 
(see Table 1).
Generalization. Valence-congruent generalization from 
both the positive and negative regions to adjacent novel 
coordinates was found to be above chance (ts ≥ 3.10, ps < 
.01, ds ≥ 1.17 [large ESs]) and comparable (i.e., there was no 
negative generalization asymmetry). Responses to the eight 
non-adjacent coordinates were recoded to reflect the propor-
tion of participants labeled as negative. Labeling of these 
coordinates was at chance levels (i.e., 0.50), indicating that 
equal numbers were seen to be positive and negative, t(28) = 
1.32, p = ns, d = 0.50 (medium ES; see Table 1).6
Recall accuracy for positive and negative stimuli in TI and BF.
Means
Negative Positive
BeanFest (BF) .77 .61
Treasure Island (TI) .72 .63
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Figure 2. The sampling phase (top) and recall (bottom) data 
from BF (Fazio et al., 2004; Experiment 1) and TI Study 1.
Note. The trends in sampling are broadly consistent between BF and TI 
(although Block 1 approach behavior in TI is elevated). Recall of positive 
stimuli is similarly accurate in TI and BF; however, recall of negative 
stimuli is more accurate in BF than in TI. BF = BeanFest; TI = Treasure 
Island.
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Discussion
Taken together, the trends in approach and recall in this study 
were broadly consistent with those seen in BeanFest. 
Participants were able to use the outcomes of their sampling 
behavior to learn about the distribution of treasure and pirates 
on the island (and adjust their future approach–avoidance 
decisions), but a remaining preponderance of incorrect 
avoidance choices resulted in a more accurate learning of the 
negative coordinates. In contrast to BeanFest, however, no 
significant generalization asymmetry was observed within 
TI.
While still evident, the learning asymmetry within this 
study was smaller than that observed within BeanFest (see 
Figure 2). This finding, combined with the lack of a signifi-
cant generalization asymmetry, is perhaps indicative of the 
opportunities that participants had to visually reference their 
decisions within the task. Specifically, in contrast to 
BeanFest, because TI participants could see all coordinates 
at all times, it would arguably be easier for them to recognize 
(and recall the valence of) presented coordinates and distin-
guish generalization targets as “new.” This should have not 
only narrowed the expected learning asymmetry but also 
should have reduced the likelihood of automatic generaliza-
tion to novel targets based on mistaken identity (i.e., confus-
ing a novel coordinate for a presented one of known valence).
However, despite the apparent advantage offered within 
TI by the opportunity to visually reference (i.e., landmark) 
sampling decisions, a significant negative learning asymme-
try did still emerge. This finding is of importance as it is 
indicative of a generalization of the negativity bias in attitude 
formation inherent to BeanFest, not only to a novel stimulus 
set (i.e., spatial coordinates) but also to a scenario where the 
stimuli can be viewed simultaneously, as opposed to 
sequentially.
Taken together, Study 1 confirmed TI as a viable para-
digm for exploring attitude formation, and one that could 
produce similar sampling and learning trends to those 
observed in BeanFest. We next sought to investigate how a 
manipulation of risk predictability might affect these 
trends.
Study 2: Risk Predictability 
Manipulation
Risk predictability was manipulated by varying participants’ 
perceptions of the risk of encountering pirates at particular 
locations. This was achieved by either informing participants 
(correctly) that the pirates would remain in their towns (con-
sistent condition), or (incorrectly) that the pirates could roam 
the island and so turn up in a location that had previously 
been safe (inconsistent condition). This manipulation was 
made without the need for actual changes to the underlying 
matrix (i.e., the pirates did not actually roam), allowing for 
the direct comparison of participants’ responses in percep-
tively stable (consistent) and unstable (inconsistent) versions 
of the same task.
It was hypothesized that participants in the consistent 
condition should show patterns of sampling and learning 
similar to those observed in Study 1.
In the inconsistent condition, the belief that outcome con-
tingencies could change was hypothesized to lead to more 
varied search behavior, especially later in the sampling 
phase. Specifically, positive locations that had previously 
been found to contain treasure might be later avoided on the 
grounds that they may now house pirates. Conversely, loca-
tions that had previously been categorized as negative might 
be later approached on the grounds that the pirates may have 
moved on.
Overall, we anticipated that the greater perceived unpre-
dictability of the environment should result in generally 
more sustained approach behavior—and hence greater expe-
rience of actual reward and punishment contingencies—but 
with paradoxically poorer learning of actual valence-location 
contingencies.
Method
Participants. Seventy (17 male and 53 female) undergraduate 
psychology students participated. All participants had nor-
mal or corrected to normal vision, were aged between 18 and 
34 (M = 20.1 years), and received partial course credit or £2 
for taking part. Thirty-five participants were assigned to each 
Table 1. Mean Recall Accuracies and Adjacent/Non-Adjacent Generalization Tendencies Within Study 1 (S1) and Study 2 (S2).
Study
Recall (SD)
Generalization (SD)
Adjacenta Non-adjacentb
Positive Negative Positive Negative Negative
S1 0.63 (0.23) 0.72 (0.18) 0.60 (0.18) 0.63 (0.20) 0.44 (0.26)
S2 (consistent) 0.68 (0.22) 0.77 (0.20) 0.61 (0.23) 0.66 (0.27) 0.50 (0.26)
S2 (inconsistent) 0.56 (0.16) 0.68 (0.16) 0.53 (0.15) 0.58 (0.14) 0.50 (0.19)
aProportion of coordinates labeled with same valence as presented neighbors.
bProportion of non-adjacent coordinates labeled as negative.
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condition. Of the 35 (10 male and 25 female) participants 
who took part in the consistent condition, 30 completed the 
sampling phase (5 receiving restarts). Of the 35 (7 male and 
28 female) participants in the inconsistent condition, 30 
completed the sampling phase (6 receiving restarts). The fol-
lowing analyses are performed on the responses of the 60 
participants who managed to complete the sampling phase.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as that outlined in 
Study 1; however, the instructions were altered so as to 
manipulate the apparent mobility of pirates. Specifically, 
participants in the consistent condition were (correctly) 
informed that pirates were confined to towns and could not 
roam the island; while participants in the inconsistent condi-
tion were (incorrectly) informed that the pirates could roam 
the island at will.
Results
Manipulation check. A manipulation check was developed to 
ensure that the instructions were having the intended effects 
on beliefs about risk predictability. This constituted the addi-
tion of a question to the questionnaire preceding the final 
debrief, which asked participants to report on the extent to 
which they felt that pirates on the island were mobile (1 = not 
at all [very static] to 5 = very much so [roam freely]). The 
primary manipulation proved successful with participants in 
the inconsistent condition considering the pirates to be sig-
nificantly more mobile than those in the consistent condition, 
t(48.04) = 3.00, p < .01, d = 0.80 (large ES; see Table 2).
Sampling phase. Participants in the consistent condition sig-
nificantly outperformed those in the inconsistent condition. 
Mean coin yield in the inconsistent condition was lower than 
that in the consistent condition, t(48.56) = 2.69, p < .01, d = 
0.71 (medium-large ES; see Table 2).
Mean positive and negative approach responses within 
the sampling phase were compared using a 3 (Block: 1, 2, 3) 
× 2 (Valence: Negative vs. Positive) × 2 (Condition: 
Consistent vs. Inconsistent) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
Two significant main effects (Block and Valence), two 2-way 
interactions (Block × Valence; Valence × Condition), and a 
3-way interaction (Block × Valence × Condition) were dis-
covered and are discussed below. The main effect of 
Condition failed to reach significance, F(1, 58) = 3.36, p = 
ns, = .06 (small ES), meaning that overall participants in both 
conditions were engaging in a similar amount of approach 
behavior across the sampling trials.
The main effect of Valence indicated that, on average, 
participants were approaching more positive than negative 
coordinates, F(1, 58) = 72.17, p < .001, = .55 (large ES). The 
main effect of Block indicated that participants tended to 
sample fewer coordinates as the blocks progressed, F(2, 57) 
= 23.80, p < .001, = .46 (large ES). These trends were quali-
fied by the Block × Valence interaction, which showed that 
levels of sampling of negative coordinates reduced signifi-
cantly more than sampling of positive coordinates over time, 
F(2, 57) = 3.70, p < .05, = .12 (medium ES).
The Valence × Condition, F(1, 58) = 7.46, p < .01, = .11 
(medium ES), and Block × Valence × Condition, F(2, 57) = 
6.70, p < .01, = .19 (medium ES), interactions indicated that 
trends in sampling behavior differed by condition. Figure 3 
illustrates that, while participants in the consistent condition 
showed the sampling pattern typical of BeanFest (i.e., main-
tained positive sampling with a decrease in negative sam-
pling), participants in the inconsistent condition showed a 
relative maintenance in the sampling of both positive and 
negative areas across time.
A t test revealed that the Block 3 sampling asymmetry 
(B3SA; calculated by subtracting Block 3 positive approach 
from Block 3 negative approach) in the consistent condition 
(M = −0.36; SD = 0.36) was significantly greater than in the 
inconsistent condition (M = −0.09; SD = 0.21), t(47.00) = 
3.61, p = .001, d = 0.95 (large ES).
The sampling-phase trends (see Figure 3) appeared to 
indicate that participants in the inconsistent and consistent 
conditions were refining their sampling behavior differently 
as a result of the risk predictability manipulation. To further 
explore this, a second repeated-measures ANOVA was con-
ducted to specifically contrast the sampling trends between 
Blocks 2 and 3.
Blocks 2 and 3 analysis. The ANOVA yielded signifi-
cant main effects of Block, F(1, 58) = 7.34, p < .01, = .11 
(medium ES), and Valence, F(1, 58) = 50.90, p < .001, = .47 
(large ES). These main effects confirmed that (a) participants 
were approaching fewer coordinates in Block 3 than in Block 
2 and (b) participants were approaching fewer negative than 
positive coordinates. The main effect of condition was not 
significant, F(1, 58) = 2.53, p = ns, = .04 (small ES).
While the two-way interactions between Block × Valence 
and Block × Condition failed to achieve conventional levels 
of significance (Fs ≤ 1.63, ps = ns, ≤ .03 [small and non-
significant ESs, respectively]), the two-way Valence × 
Condition interaction, F(1, 58) = 8.28, p < .01, = .13 (medium 
ES), and the three-way Block × Valence × Condition interac-
tion, F(1, 58) = 10.82, p < .01, = .16 (medium ES), did. These 
latter significant interactions indicated that there was a dif-
ference between the consistent and inconsistent conditions in 
the manner in which positive and negative approach behav-
ior was refined between the second and third blocks.
Table 2. Mean Ratings of Pirate Mobility, Coin Availability, and 
Mean Coin Yield in Study 2.
M (SD)
 Pirate mobility Coin availability Coin yield
Consistent 1.63 (0.89) 1.87 (1.82) 175.33 (104.81)
Inconsistent 2.57 (1.45) 2.17 (1.39) 114.67 (65.27)
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Paired samples t tests revealed that for the consistent con-
dition, between Blocks 2 and 3, approach of positive coordi-
nates was statistically comparable, t(29) = 0.81, p = ns, d = 
0.15 (non-significant ES), whereas approach of negative 
coordinates significantly reduced, t(29) = 3.30, p < .01, d = 
0.60 (medium ES). By contrast, in the inconsistent condition 
participants’ approach of positive coordinates significantly 
reduced, t(29) = 2.44, p < .05, d = 0.52 (medium ES), whereas 
approach of negative coordinates remained statistically com-
parable, t(29) = 0.35, p = ns, d = 0.05 (non-significant ES).
Mediation analysis: Pirate-mobility manipulation on Block 3 sam-
pling. A mediation analysis was conducted to establish 
whether the relationship between condition and the size of 
the B3SA was mediated by the manipulation of perceived 
risk predictability (i.e., pirate mobility).
Multiple regression analyses were first conducted to 
assess each component of the proposed mediation model. 
Condition (dummy coded: consistent = 0; inconsistent = 1) 
was negatively associated with B3SA, B = −.27, t(58) = 3.61, 
p < .001, R2 = .18, f2 = .22 (medium-large ES). Condition was 
positively associated with perceptions of pirate mobility, B = 
.93, t(58) = 3.00, p < .01, R2 = .13, f2 = .15 (medium ES). The 
mediator, pirate mobility, was negatively associated with the 
B3SA, B = −.11, t(58) = 3.72, p < .001, R2 = .28, f2 = .39 
(large ES).
Because both the a-path and b-path were significant, 
mediation analysis of the indirect effect was conducted using 
5,000 bootstrapped resamples using bias-corrected 95% con-
fidence intervals (CIs; Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). The 
direct effect of condition on B3SA reduced in size when con-
trolling for perceived pirate mobility, B = −.17, t(58) = 2.35, 
p < .05, although remained significant. The mediation analy-
sis confirmed pirate mobility as a partial mediator of the rela-
tionship between condition and B3SA, B = −.10, CI = [−0.19, 
−0.04]. See Figure 4 for the mediation diagram.7
Recall accuracy. Participants in the consistent condition 
showed more accurate recall of positive coordinates, 
t(53.25) = 2.55, p < .05, d = 0.65 (medium-large ES), than 
those in the inconsistent condition. There was a similar, 
although not significant, trend toward more accurate recall 
of negative coordinates in the consistent condition versus 
the inconsistent condition also, t(58) = 1.88, p = .06, d = 
0.50 (medium ES).
Recall of positive and negative coordinates exceeded 
chance (i.e., 0.50) in the consistent condition, ts ≥ 4.58, ps < 
.001, ds ≥ 1.70 (large ESs). While only recall of negative 
coordinates was above chance in the inconsistent condition, 
t(29) = 6.34, p < .001, d = 1.70 (large ES); there was also a 
trend toward greater than chance recall of the positive coor-
dinates, t(29) = 1.93, p = .06, d = 0.72 (medium-large ES).
Participants in both conditions demonstrated evidence of 
a bias toward more accurate recall of negative coordinates (ts 
≥ 2.78, ps < .01, ds ≥ 0.50 [medium ESs]). The size of the 
negative recall asymmetry was statistically comparable in 
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Figure 3. Three-way (Block × Valence × Condition) interaction plot showing the proportion of positive and negative approach 
responses made by participants within the consistent and inconsistent conditions (Study 2).
Note. Standard deviations for reported means for consistent and inconsistent [+/−] conditions: B1 consistent [0.19/0.20] inconsistent [0.12/0.14]; B2 consistent 
[0.22/0.25] inconsistent [0.15/0.19]; B3 consistent [0.26/0.23] inconsistent [0.20/0.26].
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both conditions, t(58) = 0.75, p = ns, d = 0.21 (small ES; see 
Table 1 for means).
Block 3 sampling and recall correlations. Correlations were run 
to see whether “accurate” sampling decisions in Block 3 
(i.e., positive approach and negative avoidance) were signifi-
cantly related to levels of accurate positive and negative 
recall, respectively. The results of the consistent condition 
revealed a significant correlation between accurate sampling 
and both positive and negative recall, rs (30) ≥ .60, ps < .001 
(large ESs). Conversely, there was no significant correlation 
between accurate sampling and recall in the inconsistent con-
dition, rs (30) ≤ .33, ps = ns (medium and small ESs).
Mediation analysis: Pirate-mobility manipulation on coordinate 
recall accuracy. To assess whether the differences in recall 
accuracy between the conditions was mediated by the manip-
ulation of perceived pirate mobility, a further mediation anal-
ysis was run. This used the mean proportion of accurate 
positive and negative coordinate recall (mean recall) as the 
dependent variable.
Initial multiple regression analyses revealed that condi-
tion (consistent = 0; inconsistent = 1) was negatively associ-
ated with mean recall, B = −.011, t(58) = 2.61, p < .05, R2 = 
.11, f2 = .12 (medium ES). Condition was positively associ-
ated with perceptions of pirate mobility, B = .93, t(58) = 3.00, 
p < .01, R2 = .13, f2 = .15 (medium ES). Estimates of pirate 
mobility were negatively associated with the mean recall, B 
= −.05, t(58) = 3.20, p < .01, R2 = .21, f2 = .27 (medium-large 
ES).
Mediation analysis of the indirect effect was conducted 
using 5,000 bootstrapped resamples using bias-corrected 
95% CIs (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). The direct effect 
of condition on mean recall became non-significant, B = 
−.06, t(58) = 1.44, p = ns, when controlling for perceived 
pirate mobility. The mediation analysis confirmed pirate 
mobility as a mediator of the relationship between condition 
and mean recall (B = −.05, CI = [−0.092, −0.018]). See 
Figure 5 for the mediation diagram.8
Generalization
Independent samples t tests revealed that participants in the 
consistent and inconsistent conditions showed equivalent 
levels of “positive generalization” and equivalent levels of 
“negative generalization” (ts ≤ 1.66, ps = ns, ds ≤ 0.42 
[small-medium ESs]; see Table 1 for means). Levels of “neg-
ative generalization” were above chance (i.e., 0.50) in both 
conditions (ts ≥ 3.25, ps < .01, ds ≥ 1.21 [large ESs]); how-
ever, “positive generalization” only exceeded chance in the 
consistent condition, t(29) = 2.60, p < .05, d = 0.97 (large 
ES); inconsistent, t(29) = 0.95, p = ns, d = 0.35 (small ES). 
The positive and negative generalization asymmetry was not 
significant in either condition (ts ≤ 1.89, ps = ns, ds ≤ 0.29 
[small ESs]).
Responses to the eight non-adjacent coordinates were 
recoded to reflect the proportion that participants labeled as 
negative. In both conditions, the labeling of these coordi-
nates was at chance levels (i.e., 0.50), meaning that there was 
no overall negativity bias in the labeling of these coordinates 
(ts ≤ 0.12, ps = ns, ds ≤ 0.05 [non-significant ESs]).9
Discussion
The results of Study 2 indicated that the manipulation of per-
ceived risk predictability had, in the absence of any actual 
underlying change to the TI matrix, prompted marked differ-
ences in the sampling behavior and recall accuracy of partici-
pants in the consistent and inconsistent conditions.
Participants in the consistent condition showed sampling-
phase trends, recall accuracies, and generalization tendencies 
consistent with having established a reasonably accurate rep-
resentation of the good and bad locations. While no significant 
Experimental
Condition 
Perceived
Pirate
Mobility
Mean Recall
.93** -.05 **
-.06 (-.11*)
Figure 5. Mediation analysis showing impact of the manipulation 
of risk predictability (perceived pirate mobility) on the 
relationship between condition (consistent vs. inconsistent) and 
mean recall (mean recall) accuracy for presented coordinates 
(Study 2).
Note. Mean recall calculated by computing the average proportion of 
negative and positive coordinates correctly labeled by participants.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Experimental
Condition 
Perceived
Pirate
Mobility  
Block 3
Sampling
Asymmetry  
.93** -.11 ***
-.10* (-.27***)
Figure 4. Mediation analysis showing impact of the manipulation 
of risk predictability (perceived pirate mobility) on the 
relationship between condition (consistent vs. inconsistent) on 
the size of the B3SA (Study 2).
Note. B3SA = Block 3 sampling asymmetry. B3SA calculated by subtracting 
Block 3 positive approach from Block 3 negative approach.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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generalization asymmetry was observed (akin to Study 1), 
there were significant negative asymmetries in Block 3 sam-
pling and recall. These trends indicated how sampling behav-
ior within the paradigm (and hence learning) was being 
governed by expected outcomes at the presented locations, a 
result supported by the significant correlations between 
“accurate” Block 3 sampling behavior and recall within this 
condition. Consistent with Study 1, it was also evident that 
the residual preponderance of false-negative beliefs resulted 
in less accurate recall of the positive coordinates.
By contrast, participants in the inconsistent condition 
showed evidence of apparently more maladaptive sampling 
behavior (particularly between Blocks 2 and 3) and poorer 
recall compared with the consistent condition, suggesting 
that the risk predictability manipulation had disrupted atti-
tude learning. Indeed, the lack of significant correlations 
between sampling and recall within this condition suggested 
that participants were not as readily matching the outcomes 
of their accurate sampling behavior in Block 3 with congru-
ent recall responses.
Interestingly, while general recall accuracy was lower in 
the inconsistent condition compared with the consistent con-
dition, a negative learning asymmetry did persist. This asym-
metry was ostensibly the result of the risk predictability 
manipulation having had a marked impact on participants’ 
learning of positive versus negative locations. We argue that 
the sampling strategy employed by participants in the incon-
sistent condition offers an explanation for the retention of 
this asymmetry.
First, if participants did believe that the island was change-
able during the sampling phase, then their resultant tenden-
cies to avoid returning to positive areas (believing them to be 
negative) and to re-approach negative areas (believing them 
to be positive) should have served to directly decrease and 
increase their actual experience of positive and negative 
location contingencies, respectively. Second, the continued 
experience of negative outcomes at areas thought to have 
been vacated by pirates (from an incorrect approach of nega-
tive coordinates) should have led to a belief among partici-
pants in the inconsistent condition that the environment was 
negatively biased. Both experiences would have likely 
inflated negative responding relative to positive responding 
in the recall phase.
It is clear, then, that the manipulation of risk predictability 
did have a notable impact on sampling trends and recall 
responses relative to seemingly more stable versions of the 
TI task. However, while we contend that the findings from 
Study 2 support the original hypothesis accompanying this 
study (i.e., that participants in the inconsistent condition had 
genuinely developed less accurate representations of the 
valence-location contingencies relative to those in the con-
sistent condition), there is a competing explanation for the 
findings that would argue that the detriment shown in sam-
pling and recall within the inconsistent condition was more 
apparent than real.
Within the sampling phase of the inconsistent condition, 
for instance, if participants were convinced that the environ-
ment was changeable, you might predict that those who had 
developed an accurate representation of the underlying 
matrix (perhaps equivalent to that of the consistent condi-
tion) should show poor sampling accuracy. In other words, 
poor sampling accuracy should be expected if participants 
had established where the good and bad locations were but 
who were then erroneously updating their approach behav-
iors based on the assumption that the valence of these loca-
tions had changed.10 Similarly, within the recall phase, if 
participants were making predictions about the likely future 
valence of locations as opposed to simply recalling their last 
experiences at these locations, then this might also be antici-
pated to artificially lower recall accuracy within the inconsis-
tent condition (this issue is dealt with further in the general 
discussion).
In sum, while we conclude that the trends in sampling and 
recall are indicative of participants in the inconsistent condi-
tion having poorer learning of the valence-location contin-
gencies, we concede that further research is required to 
disentangle the extent to which this detriment is genuine.
General Discussion
The present research developed a modified version of the 
BeanFest paradigm which we used to investigate how people 
might form attitudes toward spatial location within a percep-
tively variable active learning scenario (i.e., where the pre-
dictability of risk could be manipulated) but one in which 
they could landmark their approach–avoidance decisions. 
Study 1 illustrated that trends in sampling and learning in the 
new TI paradigm were broadly consistent with those seen in 
BeanFest studies (e.g., Eiser & Fazio, 2008; Fazio et al., 
2004; Shook, Fazio, & Eiser, 2007); however, no significant 
generalization asymmetry was observed. Study 2 revealed 
how a simple manipulation of perceived (not actual) risk pre-
dictability was apparently sufficient to disrupt participants’ 
learning of the actual underlying valence-location contingen-
cies, although the extent to which this detriment is real or 
apparent should be resolved through further research.
The results of Study 1 are important in illustrating the 
generalization of the negative learning asymmetry inherent 
to BeanFest to (a) an ostensibly easier learning environment 
(i.e., where participants could landmark their approach–
avoidance decisions) and (b) a task using a qualitatively dif-
ferent kind of stimulus (i.e., spatial location vs. beans). We 
suggest that this is indicative of the robust nature of this 
asymmetry under perceptively stable conditions.
We argue that the opportunity to landmark approach–
avoidance decisions within TI explains the lack of the emer-
gence of a clear generalization asymmetry. Unlike BeanFest, 
it would have been easier for TI participants to recognize 
generalization coordinates as new, thus limiting automatic 
generalization based on mistaken identity (i.e., mistaking a 
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novel bean of unknown valence for a presented bean of 
known valence due to visual similarities). We contend that 
this finding is indicative that the generalization asymmetry 
inherent to BeanFest is, at least in part, tied to the decision to 
sequentially present stimuli—as people are required to retro-
spectively recall rather than simultaneously reference their 
decisions.
The results of Study 2 indicate the apparently detrimental 
impact that perceived risk predictability has on attitude 
learning and, in doing so, assert that one should take care 
when generalizing the findings from BeanFest to situations 
where the environment and the objects therein are percep-
tively more variable. Our research suggests that within per-
ceptively variable environments, the translation of experience 
into learning is slower and less clearly defined than posited 
by the results of studies employing the BeanFest paradigm. 
That having been said, even within this perceptively more 
variable context, the negative learning asymmetry common 
to BeanFest did still emerge. We argue that this finding is 
thus indicative of the transferability of this asymmetry to 
perceptively less stable learning contexts.
Paradigm Limitations and Future Research
While the research outcomes from these studies may hold 
some relevance for our understanding of judgment and deci-
sion making (JDM) in risky situations (for a discussion of the 
research challenges in this field, see Rakow & Newell, 2010) 
and human foraging behavior (e.g., Goldstone & Ashpole, 
2004; Goldstone et al., 2005), we reason that they are most 
valuable for (a) enhancing our understanding of “active” atti-
tude formation within ostensibly variable environments and 
(b) producing a tool for further expanding our understanding 
of this under-researched field of psychology. However, bear-
ing in mind the novelty of this paradigm and the limitations 
in the studies outlined, there remains a number of interesting 
research opportunities in this area. We outline a few of these 
below.
Changes to the task instructions
Obedience to authority. Building on the early findings 
of Fazio, Eiser, and colleagues (Eiser et al., 2007; Fazio et 
al., 2004, Experiment 5), these studies highlight the influ-
ence that an individuals’ beliefs about a learning environ-
ment can have on their perception of actual reinforcement 
contingencies experienced. Notably, within the inconsistent 
condition, participants appeared to give greater credence to 
the expected outcomes (based on the indirect information 
provided at the start of the task), rather than their directly 
experienced outcomes at these locations. Indeed, within this 
condition people were seemingly less able to overcome the 
(incorrect) advice provided to them before commencing the 
task, resulting in significantly poorer performance.
It is possible that this finding is related to the fact that the 
task instructions came from the experimenter, whom 
participants perhaps saw as either an expert and/or as unlikely 
to provide incorrect information. It could be hypothesized 
that if the instructions was seen as coming from a less author-
itative source (e.g., other participants, for example, Eiser et 
al., 2007; Fazio et al., 2004) that people might have more 
quickly overcome the inaccuracies in the advice provided 
and would thus show sampling and recall patterns consistent 
with better learning.
Equally, however, this finding may stem from a conflict 
between motivation and learning within this perceptively 
more complex version of TI (see discussion of Yerkes-
Dodson Law, for example, Hanoch & Vitouch, 2004; 
Liberman, 1993; Teigen, 1994). Specifically, the perceived 
complexity of the inconsistent condition could have led par-
ticipants to complete the task in a narrower, more piecemeal 
fashion than those in the consistent condition. This might 
have resulted in a kind of “confused chasing” of individual 
pay-offs and difficulties in recognizing the broader regional 
contingencies present within the life-space (see Ert & Erev, 
2007).
We argue that a formal investigation of (a) how the per-
ceived source of the instructions and advice within the task 
influences sampling and recall trends and (b) the interactions 
between motivation and attitude learning within a TI or 
BeanFest type scenario could provide fruitful avenues for 
future research in this field.
The impact of inconsistency: Poorer learning or experimen-
tal artifact? We have concluded that the manipulation of 
risk predictability in Study 2 led to a poorer leaning of the 
actual location-valence contingencies among participants in 
the inconsistent condition as compared with the consistent 
condition. This conclusion would appear to fit both with the 
more indiscriminate sampling and poorer recall accuracy 
shown in this condition. However, we have also discussed 
the possibility that the detriment within the inconsistent 
condition could be more apparent than real. This alterna-
tive explanation could be strengthened by limitations in the 
instructions accompanying the recall task.
In short, while the instructions accompanying the recall 
task asked participants to remember which areas were “good” 
and “bad” (i.e., insinuating that the participants should recall 
their last experiences at each location), it is possible that 
some participants believed that this instruction was asking 
them to predict future outcomes at each location (as was the 
case of novel coordinates presented during this phase). If this 
was the case, and if those in the inconsistent condition main-
tained a belief that the environment was changeable, then 
this could help to explain the lower recall accuracy in this 
condition. That is, while participants in both conditions may 
have had an equivalent appreciation of the pay-off matrix at 
the end of the sampling phase (i.e., may have shown equiva-
lent learning), those in the inconsistent condition may have 
been less trusting of this knowledge in predicting future 
experiences at given locations. Thus, if these participants’ 
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recall responses were reflective of anticipated future out-
comes at visited locations (not intended) rather than their 
most recent experience at these locations (intended), this 
could have artificially lowered recall accuracy in this 
condition.
Future research could usefully adapt the TI procedure to 
formally investigate this possibility. This could be achieved 
by a simple rephrasing of the recall instructions to ensure 
that participants focus on their last known experience at each 
location. These responses could then be compared with those 
from a secondary task where participants are invited more 
explicitly to make predictions about the future valence of 
each location. One would anticipate that accuracy should be 
similarly poor in both “recall” and “prediction” tasks if the 
risk predictability manipulation has resulted in genuinely 
poorer learning; but that “recall” should be superior to “pre-
diction” (and on par with responses in the consistent condi-
tions), if the effect of the manipulation is more artifactual.
Creating a more realistic foraging space
Actual versus implied change to stimulus valence. TI is not 
a traditional foraging paradigm in the sense that partici-
pants do not personally navigate the environment to identify 
resources but are, akin to BeanFest, presented with a pre-
selected series of stimuli in a randomized order. Moreover, 
within the current studies, the manipulation of risk predict-
ability was achieved through a variations in the information 
provided to participants only and not through actual changes 
to the underlying pay-off matrix.
While both factors could be seen to undermine the eco-
logical validity of the findings, these design decisions were 
purposeful so as to ensure a broad underlying comparability 
to all test conditions (i.e., all participants had the same poten-
tial to have the same experiences within the task). Also, 
while there was no underlying change to the pay-off matrix, 
it was reasoned that the predictability manipulation should 
be self-propagating and would thus not require us to make 
such changes. Specifically, to the extent that participants 
were basing their decisions on the expected outcomes, the 
self-generation and subsequent approach of false-positive 
beliefs (generated by the manipulation of environmental 
consistency) should have enhanced the perception of the 
environment as changeable.
Participants in the inconsistent condition did believe the 
pirates to be more mobile in comparison with the consistent 
condition; however, estimates of mobility within this condi-
tion were fairly moderate. This is presumably because of the 
actual underlying stability of the pay-off matrix and the tim-
ing of the manipulation check (i.e., the manipluation check 
took place after the TI task was complete and so participants 
may have established that the pirates were immobile). It is 
likely, therefore, that the results of the risk predictability 
manipulation observed within this research are moderate 
compared with those that would be expected from studies 
where the predictability threat is real (i.e., where the pay-off 
matrix does vary).
Future research should thus investigate to what extent 
attitude learning is affected within actually variable contexts 
and/or where participants are more able to select the order in 
which they experience stimuli, akin to more real-world 
foraging.
The impact of resource depletion on attitude learning. Real-
world foragers must often contend with resource deple-
tion, for example, as inter- and intra-species competition 
for resources alters the availability of these resources (e.g., 
Goldstone et al., 2005; Goldstone et al., 2008). Future stud-
ies might investigate how resource depletion (i.e., the pre-
dictability of reward) might affect on sampling decisions and 
attitude formation within the paradigm. This manipulation 
could be achieved either by altering the actual availability 
of resources (i.e., treasure) on the island or, akin to Study 
2, by altering participants’ perceptions about the availability 
of treasure on the island (e.g., informing them that treasure 
yielding coordinates might have less/no treasure once sam-
pled).
One key feature of TI that would aid such investigation is 
that it lessens the rigid “resource-trial” contingency present 
in BeanFest. As opposed to BeanFest where for each trial 
participants must choose to approach (eat) or avoid (not eat) 
individual beans, TI presents participants with spatial coordi-
nates that could feasibly contain variable amounts of a 
desired resource (e.g., lots of treasure or not much treasure) 
that could be seen to deplete as a result of sampling 
decisions.
Investigating individual differences and other applications
The impact of personality and individual differences. The 
BeanFest and TI studies indicate that attitude learning within 
contingent-feedback scenarios is (a) related to the approach 
and avoidance decisions of participants; and (b) influenced 
not only by the information provided to participants but 
also by state and trait individual differences (e.g., Conklin 
et al., 2009; Fazio et al., 2004; Pietri et al., 2013; Shook & 
Fazio, 2009). For example, Fazio et al. (2004, Experiment 3) 
showed that priming people to be more promotion or preven-
tion focused within BeanFest resulted in smaller and larger 
negative learning asymmetries, respectively. Furthermore, 
Shook and Fazio (2009) discovered that political conserva-
tism related to more avoidant strategies in BeanFest, result-
ing in a stronger learning asymmetry compared with those 
with a more liberal political ideology.
The TI paradigm offers further opportunity to investigate 
how individual differences might interact with attitude learn-
ing, particularly within less-predictable contexts. Of particu-
lar interest here could be traits relating to an individual’s 
tolerance of uncertainty; for example, low ambiguity toler-
ance (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995), high need for closure 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), and high personal need for 
structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). These personality 
characteristics have been linked to a number of impression 
formation biases (e.g., the correspondence bias and 
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erroneous group stereotyping) as people attempt to ascribe 
order to their social world (see also Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, 
& O’Brien, 1995). Feasibly, the TI paradigm could be uti-
lized to explore how these characteristics might facilitate or 
impede attitude learning within variable environments, 
which could have implications for our understanding of prej-
udice formation and transmission.
Intergroup prejudice. Relatedly, the TI paradigm could 
provide a better platform for assessing the formation and 
function of attitudes toward more socially relevant stimuli 
(e.g., individuals, groups) than BeanFest. The TI theme argu-
ably makes the experimental scenario more social than that 
presented by BeanFest. That is, rather than approaching and 
avoiding “beans,” participants enter a dynamic intergroup 
setting where they run the risk of approaching a threaten-
ing group of people (in this case pirates). While variations of 
BeanFest have been utilized to draw inferences about inter-
group processes (e.g., stereotyping; Deutsch & Fazio, 2008), 
we contend that TI provides a more appropriate conceptual 
platform for investigating such issues due to the more social 
nature of the exploratory context,.
Future research could, for instance, focus on how preju-
dice reduction strategies might affect the formation, mainte-
nance, and transmission of the negative learning and 
generalization asymmetries common to this research (see 
Paluck & Green, 2009). One might anticipate that strategies 
promoting greater openness to interactions with outgroups 
(e.g., imagined contact; Crisp & Turner, 2009) could serve to 
increase sampling behavior, thus reducing the size of these 
asymmetries.
Conclusion 
The aim of these studies was to advance understanding of 
attitude formation processes via direct personal experience 
within ostensibly risky environments through the develop-
ment and testing of a new computer-based paradigm based 
on BeanFest (i.e., TI). The findings of Study 1 support the 
pioneering research achieved using the BeanFest paradigm, 
illustrating how an apparent failure to correct for false-nega-
tive beliefs results in the emergence of negative learning 
asymmetry. However, it would appear that provision of an 
opportunity to visually landmark decisions attenuates the 
size of this asymmetry and limits the extent of generalization 
from learning experiences. Meanwhile, the results of Study 2 
indicate how a verbal manipulation of risk predictability can 
serve to disrupt sampling behavior and recall in the task.
Taken together the findings of this research would appear 
to confirm the robust nature of the negative learning asym-
metry in contingent-learning settings but simultaneously 
argue that care should be taken when seeking to generalizing 
the findings of BeanFest studies to ostensibly more variable 
contexts and/or those where participants can more easily 
landmark their decisions. This is an important finding being 
that real-world environments are perceptively (and often 
actually) (a) more changeable than BeanFest asserts; and (b) 
often offer more opportunity for people to reference their 
decisions than is provided in the BeanFest paradigm. We 
hope that TI will be further utilized and developed to further 
advance research in this presently under-investigated field of 
attitude research.
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Notes
 1. While the option of varying the perceived consistency of target 
stimuli could be investigated within BeanFest (e.g., by inform-
ing participants that beans could ripen or rot over time); the 
Treasure Island (TI) paradigm allows for a more parsimonious 
investigation of this manipulation within an experimental con-
text that can be used to investigate the other factors of interest 
to the current research.
 2. Participants were encouraged to actively approach or avoid 
coordinates by pressing the “Z” and “M” keys. If no response 
was made within 60 s of the stimulus presentation, this was 
treated as a nil response. There were no sampling-phase nil 
responses within the studies presented in this article.
 3. The instructions and practice took approx. 5-7 min to com-
plete. The restart window for evictees would thus have covered 
the instructions, the practice trials, and a small proportion of 
Block 1 sampling (mainly the first 12-fixed moves). Restarted 
evictees should therefore not have accrued a significant learn-
ing advantage over non-restarters. By contrast, evictees fall-
ing outside this window may have (a) accrued too much of a 
comparative advantage over others or (b) completed too few 
sampling trials to participate fairly in the recall phase. Hence, 
their eviction was final and their data were removed.
 4. If no response was made within 10 s, this was treated as an 
incorrect labeling of the target coordinate. Nil responding 
was rare: In Study 1, only two nil responses were recorded, 
whereas in Study 2 there was one nil response in the inconsis-
tent condition and three in the consistent condition.
 5. Effect size (ES) magnitude inferences were made according 
to Cohen (1988, 1992): (partial eta-squared) and f2 (Cohen’s 
f2) = .02 (small), .13 (medium), .26 (large); d (Cohen’s d) 
= 0.20 (small), 0.50 (medium), 0.80 (large); r (Pearson’s 
r) = .10 (small), .30 (medium), .50 (large). Where an 
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ES is termed “non-significant,” this refers to statistical 
significance.
 6. There were two nil responses in non-adjacent coordinate label-
ing. Even when accounting for this, the difference from chance 
remained non-significant (M = 0.44, SD = 0.27), t(28) = 1.19, 
p = ns, d = 0.45 (medium ES).
 7. It is likely that the strength of this mediation was affected by 
the timing of when participants provided estimates of pirate 
mobility. Participants only made such estimates at the end 
of the TI task, at a time when they might have learned that 
the pirates were less mobile than thought. A secondary boot-
strapped mediation confirmed that learning (as assessed by 
the B3SA) did mediate the relationship between condition 
and estimates of pirate mobility (c path: p < .004; c′ path: p 
< .167). Future research should thus seek to clarify the theo-
retical impact of the predictability manipulation on learning 
by having participants assess pirate mobility at an earlier time 
point(s) within the task.
 8. See Note 6 for a potential weakness with this mediation 
analysis.
 9. There was one nil response in non-adjacent coordinate label-
ing. Even when accounting for this, the difference from chance 
remained non-significant (M = 0.49, SD = 0.19), t(29) = 0.18, 
p = ns, d = 0.07 (non-significant ES).
10. Sampling trends were statistically comparable between the 
conditions in Blocks 1 and 2, only diverging significantly 
between Blocks 2 and 3. Arguably, this could be taken as evi-
dence that the participants in each condition had equivalent 
learning of the matrix by Block 2 but then applied this learning 
differently on later trials (Block 3).
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